The African Continental Free Trade Area has been hailed as a major milestone in the drive for African unity, with a market of over 1.3 billion people and a combined GDP of over $3.4 trillion.
Recent anti-immigrant outbreaks in South Africa have highlighted a dilemma – the drive for African unity is being undermined by increasing fracturing at interpersonal levels.
At a June Invest Africa conference in London, governments, investors, and business leaders spoke confidently about the opportunities presented by AfCFTA, with one presentation unveiling an ambitious vision of transforming Durban into a major hub of finance and tourism.
But on the streets of Durban, a different reality was unfolding, with black African ‘foreigners’ being confronted by anti-migration activists and ordered to leave ahead of a looming deadline.
An anti-migrant activist, Nkosikhona Ndabandaba, explained his vision for Durban’s future, which was similar to the Invest Durban plan, but with indigenous South Africans as the beneficiaries, not foreign workers.
This contradiction exposes one of the deepest contradictions in contemporary Pan-Africanism – global investors receive incentives while fellow Africans often encounter suspicion, bureaucracy, or violence.
Recent events in South Africa suggest that the omission of a pan-African ethics in the development of a pan-African consciousness is becoming increasingly costly, with social media amplifying national rivalries, digital hostility, and ethnic chauvinism.
As the African Union recognises the diaspora as Africa’s Sixth Region, economic hardship is being redirected towards mobile Africans, creating a toxic pan-African space.
Part of the explanation for deteriorating interpersonal relations lies in the gradual disintegration of the post-Berlin Conference political settlement and colonial borders inherited at independence.
Across the continent, there is a renewed recovery of older political communities – ethnic nations, kingdoms, language areas, and historic civilisations – which long pre-date the modern state.
Recovering these histories is neither surprising nor undesirable, but the danger arises when cultural identity becomes political exclusion, determining who truly belongs and who can be treated as an outsider.
The transition from anti-colonial solidarity to post-independence competition has only intensified these tensions, with countries increasingly competing for investment, jobs, and influence, much like economic growth relies on stronger links.
If AfCFTA is to become more than an economic treaty, Africa needs a shared civic ethic, alongside mobility, to determine what obligations hosts owe visitors and what responsibilities visitors owe their hosts.
These are not simply immigration questions, but civilisational questions, requiring a shared ethic of reciprocity, hospitality, mutual obligation, and respect.
Unless Africa develops this ethical foundation alongside its economic integration, the risk is a common market where capital moves freely while Africans remain divided by fear, resentment, and periodic violence.
The greatest weakness of AfCFTA is not economic but moral, seeking to create a single African market before creating a single African moral community.
Markets can be established by treaties.
Trust cannot, and it is this trust that will ultimately determine the success or failure of AfCFTA, as seen in efforts to revive industries across the continent.
